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In the Best Interest: The Adoption
of F.H., an Indian Child
I.

INTRODUCTION

The competing interests of biological parents, adoptive
parents, extended family, child welfare agencies, and the children themselves make adoption difficult under any circumstances. Even when all parties enter into the adoption intending to provide a secure home for the child there may be genuline, conflicting values and disagreement as to what will serve
the child's best interest. 1 The definition of "best interest" has
become a battleground for child-welfare experts, with different
factions giving priority to emotional security, medical needs,
educational resources, economic stability, ethnic background, or
other factors.
When the adoption involves an Indian child and non-Indian adoptive parents, cultural factors and statutory restrictions
complicate an already complex and emotional process. Indian
tribes have long mourned the loss of their most precious asset,
their children, to non-Indian adoptive parents. 2 When an Indian child is removed from his or her tribal roots and transplanted into society outside the native culture, both the tribe and
the child sustain a loss. 3 There is no easy remedy for such loss,
though many concerned and dedicated people have struggled
with the problem. 4 This note examines the issues surrounding
adoption of Indian children by non-Indian parents through the
case of F.H., 5 an Alaskan native child from the Village of
Noatak, Alaska, and the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act6 ( ICWA) to such cases.
Section II describes the factual and procedural background
of the case. Section III discusses the provisions and the legislative history of the ICWA. Section IV analyzes the application of

1 See. e.g., Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 27 GoNZ. L. REV. 3fl:1 (1992).
2 ld. at ;iM.
3 Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (19R4).
4 ld.
fi In re Adoption of F.H., 8fi1 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
6 25 U.S.C. § 19m (1988).
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the ICWA to the present case. The note concludes that a child's
well-being must weigh heavily in the balance against the interests of other parties.

II.

FACT SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

Factual Background

F.H. is a female child born February 24, 1990, to a native
Alaskan mother. 7 The identity of her biological father is not
known. 8 Her mother, identified only as E.P.D., is a member of
the Alaskan village of Noatak, though she has not resided in
the village for several years and has no plans to retum. During
her pregnancy, E.P.D. was homeless and suffering from severe
alcohol dependence. 9 E.P.D. is orphaned, with no close ties to
her native village. Her mother was murdered by a brother. Her
father died of alcoholism. None of E.P.D.'s siblings grew up in
Noatak, though she does have a cousin, Mary Penn, who lives
there.
At the time of her baby's birth, E.P.D. had a blood alcohol
level of .275. 10 Due to E.P.D.'s homeless status, the history of
alcohol abuse, and the high blood alcohol level at birth, F.H.
was taken into custody by the state welfare organization, the
Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS), shortly after
birth. Due to prenatal alcohol abuse by the mother, the child
was at risk for Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE), though not fullblown Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) which is similar though
more severe. 11
F.H. was subsequently placed in a series of four foster
homes. The third set of foster parents, the Hartleys, cared for
F.H. from June 1990, when she was approximately four months

7 Adoption of F.H., ilfi1 P.2d at l:i62.
8 ld.
9 ld.
10 A person with a blood alcohol level of .01 is legally drunk in most states.
At the level of .(ll, one in every thousand parts of blood is pure alcohol. A concentration of .4 can produce a coma. RICIIARIJ J. WA<;MAN, MEDICAL AND HEALTH
ENCYCLOPEDIA 499-FiOU (198::l).
11 Adoption of F.H., 8Fi1 P.2d at 1::lfi2. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) results
from maternal prenatal consumption of alcohol. The effects on the child include
facial malformations, mental retardation, behavior problems, and learning disorders.
The full syndrome affects one in every 700 live births in this country. In some
Indian communities, the incidence is as high as one in eight births. Fetal Alcohol

Effects (FAE) is a milder form of the syndrome. Ann P. Stressguth et al., Fetal
Alcohol SyndromP in AdolPscents and Adults, 26fi JAMA 1961, 1961 (1991).
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old, until June 1991 when the foster father, Carol Hartley was
transferred from Alaska to Kennewick, Washington. F.H., then
sixteen months old, was placed with a fourth foster family. In
March of 1992, at age two years, F.H. was adopted by the
Hartleys and now lives with them in Washington. Child welfare officials in Washington have indicated that F.H. is happy,
well-adjusted, and seems to be making good progress. She may
continue to have medical problems resulting from prenatal
alcohol exposure. 12
During the time F.H. was in foster care, her biological
mother discussed giving up custody to several people, including
her cousin and the Hartleys. 13 Notably, F.H. never lived with
her biological mother or any member of her extended family,
nor has she ever been to Noatak. 14
The adoption was an open placement allowing the child
access to her biological family and her native heritage. 15
E.P.D. believed that she could visit the child more easily in
Kennewick than Noatak. The birth mother and the extended
biological family were given visitation rights and F.H. retained
inheritance rights from E.P.D. 16

B.
1.

Procedural Background

The adoption

When DFYS took custody of F.H., the agency filed a Child
in Need of Aid (CINA) petition, and notified the village in compliance with provisions of the ICWA.' 7 A petition to terminate
E.P.D.'s parental rights was filed in August 1991, with trial set
for September 18, 1991. On September 16, two days prior to
the trial date, E.P.D. executed documents voluntarily relinquishing parental rights to the Hartleys. 18 E.P.D. stipulated
three conditions: (1) the Hartleys proceed with adoption of

12 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1362.
13 !d.
14 !d.
15 Open adoption, as used by this court, permits visitation by the biological
parents, and family records of both adoptive and biological families are available to
the child. !d. at 1~{63.
16 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1:163.
17 The ICWA requires notice to the tribe, or in this case, the native village,
that adoption or eustody proeeedings are pending whenever the state has reason to
believe the child involved is or may be an Indian child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988).
See also In re J.W., 498 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa Ct. App. 1973).
18 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1:{6:{-65.
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F.H.; (2) F.H. retain inheritance rights from E.P.D.; and (3)
E.P.D. and her extended family retain visitation rights with
F.H.
The Hartleys filed a Petition for Adoption the following
day. The adoption was approved on March 5, 1992, despite
vigorous opposition by the village. 19 The judge approved the
adoption based on the following factors: (1) the preference of
the birth mother; (2) the open status of the Hartley adoptive
placement; and (3) the continued inheritance and visitation
rights of the birth family, giving F.H. access to her native heritage.20 Social service officials made numerous contacts with
the Hartley family during the first year of the adoption, and
agency reports were very positive about the placement. 21

2.

The appeal

On appeal by the village, the Court stated that the issue
was "whether the superior court erred in concluding that good
cause existed to deviate from the adoptive placement preferences22 mandated under the ICWA."23 The Hartleys had to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that there was good
cause for permitting a placement other than those preferred
under the ICWA The court had discretion to determine if good
cause existed, based on the facts of the individual case. 24
What constitutes good cause will vary, based on the facts of the
case, and may include "the best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents, the suitability of persons preferred
for placement and the child's ties to the tribe."25
The Supreme Court of Alaska found no abuse of discretion
19 In October 1991, after receiving notice of the Petition for Adoption, the
village moved to intervene in the proceeding, based on the right of intervention
under the ICWA. !d. The ICWA gives tribes a right of intervention anytime during
a custody proceeding involving an Indian child. 2fi U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988). The
Hartleys argued that intervention was barred by laches. It was held to be "doubtful" that laches could be raised in such a case, in view of the tribe's right to intervene at any time.
20 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363-65.
21 An early interventionist who worked with F.H. in the Hartley's home
twice a month for almost one year believes F.H. made substantial progress during
that period and that F.H.'s bond with Nancy Hartley is the best F.H. will ever
have. Both guardians ad litem assigned to F.H. testified that they believe it is in
F.H.'s best interest to be placed with the Hartleys. !d. at 1364-65.
22 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
23 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1364-65.
24 !d.
2fi !d.
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by the lower court, 26 and approved this adoption by non-Indian adoptive parents even though the native village opposed the
placement, intervened in the action, and offered an alternative
placement with an extended family member, Mary Penn, who
qualified as a first priority placement preference under the
statutory directives of the ICWA. 27 The basis for the decision
lies in the state court interpretation of the available exemptions from the ICWA placement preferences. To understand
these exemptions, it is necessary to look at the history and
provisions of the Act.
Ill.

A.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

Legislative History and Intent

The ICWA is the product of long-standing dissatisfaction
and frustration with adoption and custody procedures commonly used to separate Indian children from their native families
and culture. Though these procedures were not specifically
intended to cause separation and cultural deprivation to the
child or the tribe, the effect on native American tribes was
devastating. 28 During legislative hearings on the ICWA, it
was estimated that between one-fourth and one-third of all
Indian children had been removed from their Indian homes by
various public and private organizations, and placed in nonIndian homes or in other non-Indian custodial arrangements,
such as boarding schools. 29 Congress sought to reverse this
trend by enacting the ICWA, which states in its opening passages, "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."30

26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Linda A. Marousek, Note, The Indian Child WP!farf' Act of 1978: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D. L. REV. 98 (1980).
29 In Minnesota, for example, during 1971-1972, nearly one-fourth of all Indian infants born in the state were placed for adoption, with 90% of those infants
placed in non-Indian homes. Hearings on 8. 1214 Before Senate Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 538-40 (1977). Indian children overall were
eight times more likely than non-Indian children to be in adoptive homes. Id.
30 Among other things Congress found:

(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken
up hy the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
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The statute recognizes inherent differences in child care
practices between Indian and non-Indian cultures, previously
not given positive consideration. These basic differences are
more than merely alternative means to the same end. Tribal
childrearing practices result from a fundamentally different
world view. This cultural conflict is poignantly obvious in the
following statement of Indian leaders in 1744. Virginia colonists invited Iroquois boys to leave the tribal community and
attend the College of William and Mary. The Iroquois leaders
declined the invitation.
We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning
taught in those Colleges, and the Maintenance of our young
men, while with you, would be very expensive for you. We are
convinced, that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and
we thank you heartily. But you, who are wise must know that
different Nations have different Conceptions of things and
you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind
of Education happen not to be the same as yours. We have
had some Experience of it. Several of our Young People were
formerly brought up at the Colleges of the Northern Provinces; they were instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they
came back to us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every
means ofliving in the woods ... neither fit for Hunters, Warriors, nor Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We
are, however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer, tho' we
decline accepting it; and to show our grateful Sense of it, if
the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons,
we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we

nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions; and
(5) that the United States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.
§ 1902. Congressional declaration of policy
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes
which will reflect the unique values of Indian (:ulture, and by providing
for assistance to tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902 (1988).
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know, and make Men ofthem. 31

Mter 250 years, one can sense the consternation of the
Gentlemen of Virginia at the refusal of their offer, teamed with
a pointed rebuke of the cultural arrogance that assumed Indian
youths would be better off cared for and educated by non-Indians. Implicit in the offer is an ignorance of the gap in educational priorities between the two cultures.
Generations later, these assumptions continue to cause
pain and misunderstanding between the cultures, evidenced in
the following statement of Mr. Calvin Isaac, a modern tribal
leader:
One of the most serious failings of the present systems is that
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural
parents by nontribal governmental authorities who have no
basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of
the individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best
ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of
the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a nonIndian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian
child. 32

Misunderstanding arises from the conception of extended
family and the determination of who constitutes an appropriate
caregiver in tribal culture. 33 Most Indians who maintain traditional ways consider the entire tribe to be quasi-family, and
have close relationships with numerous relatives by blood and
marriage. The misinterpretation of these relationships has
been a source of mutual frustration to social workers and Indians. An Indian parent under stress may leave children in the
care of extended family members, without intending a permanent placement. 34 Social workers have occasionally interpreted
81 Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the
Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian
Children, 7 AM. INDIAN 1. REV. 51 (1979).
82 (Emphasis added.) Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
:w (19R9), citing the testimony of Chief Isaac at the congressional hearing passage
of the ICWA; see also Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1978).
88 See, e.g., Graybeal v. Alaska, 912 F.2d 468 (Alaska 1990). An informal
custodial placement arranged according to traditional Athabascan tribal practices
was sufficient to satisfy the ICWA definition of Indian custodian, even though the
child's natural mother opposed continuing the placement.
84 Occasionally, the child may be left with non-Indian friends. In a pre-
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this temporary arrangement as abandonment and initiated
proceedings to remove the child from the home and terminate
parental rights, much to the astonishment and indignation of
the Indian caregiver. 35
Not all child removal cases result from such benign circumstances, and not all Indian children placed with other Indian or
non-Indian families end up in happy, loving homes. Alcoholism
and drug dependency remain serious problems on and off reservations.36 Genuine neglect and physical abuse disrupt Indian
families just as they do other families. These social ills are
exacerbated in Indian communities by a dearth of employment
opportunities, poverty, inadequate medical facilities, and limited access to education. 37 Nevertheless, in the ICWA, Congress
has attempted to preserve for Indian children the right to remain in their native culture even when foster care or adoptive
placement is required. 38

ICWA case, a Crow mother allowed non-Indian friends, the Wakefields, to take her
child, in the belief they would care for him while she was unable to do so. The
mother refused requests for adoption. When she later wanted the child returned,
the Wakefields, who had intended to keep the child permanently, were distressed
and sought assistance from Maryland courts, which declined subject matter jurisdiction. The tribal court returned the child to its mother. This appears to be an example of misunderstanding between Indian and non-Indian about the nature of the
temporary custody relationship. See Wakefield v. Little Light, :347 A.2d 228 (Md.
1975).
:3fi Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. :30, :35 n.4 (1989).
One of the particular points of concern was the failure of the non-Indian
child welfare workers to understand the role of the extended family in
Indian society. The House Report on the ICWA noted, 'An Indian child
may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers,
untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the
nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental
rights ... .'

!d.
:36 See In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 4::!7 (Minn. 1990); In re Riva M.,
235 Cal. App. :-ld 403 (Cal. 1991).
:37 See Village of Chalkystik v. M.S.F., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); In re
Wanomi, 216 Cal. App. 3d 156 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Appeal in Coconino Co. Juvenile Action No. J10175, 736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. 1987); K.N. v. Alaska, 856 P.2d 468
(Alaska 199:i).
:38 A related situation concerns Indian children who do not have intact Indian families and little or no contact with their native culture. A good example is
that of illegitimate children who are born off the reservation to non-Indian mothers. It has been suggested that such children do not fall within the intent of the
ICWA. See. e.fii., In re Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 80::! P.2d 24 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991); see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1992); In re
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Provisions of the Act

The Indian Child Welfare Act does not bind tribal courts.
It applies only to state court custody proceedings, 39 and is designed to prevent placement of Indian children with non-Indian
adoptive or foster parents. Ostensibly, these provisions provide
for the child's best interest, though the ICWA may define these
interests differently for Indian adoptions than state courts'
definition of best interest for adoption procedures of non-Indian
children. 40

1. Defining ((Indian child" under the ICWA
Defining "Indian child" for the purposes of the ICWA is
crucial to understanding the statuteY The designation "Indian" is a term of art in Indian law, and carries different meanings for the purposes of different statutes. "Indian" may refer to
any person with native American ancestry, though the "quantum of Indian blood" necessary for definition as an "Indian"
varies from tribe to tribe and according to the statute. The
term may refer to someone who functions as a member of a
specific Indian tribe. Though there is no definitive inclusive
definition, to be considered "Indian" a person must generally
have at least one ancestor who lived on this continent before
the coming of Europeans, and must be recognized as an Indian
by other Indians in his or her community. 42 However, ancestry
and cultural recognition are not enough to grant membership
in any tribe, absent tribal consent. 43 Individual tribes determine enrollment requirements, which is significant in establishing eligibility for many federal programs. In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) defined "Indian" for most federal
programs as any person who is a member of any recognized
tribe. 44
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
~{9 See Dale, supra note 1, at 353.
40 See Howard, supra note 3, at 503.
41 The party seeking to invoke the ICWA has the burden of proof that the
child in question is an Indian child within the definition of the ICWA. In re
J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1990).
42 ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 83-85 (1991).
43 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 536 U.S. 49, 55 (1978). The Supreme
Court upheld the right of the Pueblo to deny tribal membership to children of
female members who marry outside the tribe, while admitting similarly situated
children of men of that tribe.
44 The IRA uses the following definition:
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The definitions of "Indian child" and "Indian tribe"45 in
the ICWA are very similar to IRA provisions and adopt most of
the factors previously recognized as conferring "Indian" status,
while adding several unique concepts. 46 For the purposes of
the ICWA, an Indian child is (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) a person who is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe ... Y
When any state court knows or has reason to believe that
the subject of a child custody proceeding is an Indian child
according to the definitions of the Act, that court must notify
the child's tribe. 48 The ICWA extends certain rights to the

The term Indian . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any Indian tribe recognized now under Federal jurisdiction,
and all persons who are descendants of such members who were on June
1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation,
and shall further include all other persons of one·half or more Indian
blood . . . . Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988).
45 In re Petition to Adopt T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
The Appellate Court of Illinois considered the definition of "Indian tribe" for the
purposes of the ICWA, and ruled that the ICWA is not applicable to Indians who
are members of Canadian tribes not recognized by the United States government,
and that exclusion from the provisions of the ICWA did not violate equal protection rights.
46 "Indian" child is defined as follows:
Indian child means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and
is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe;
"Indian child's tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which the Indian
child is a member or (b) in the case of an Indian child who is a member
of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe
with which the Indian child has the more significant contacts;
"Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal custody of
an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to
whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred
by the parent of such child;
25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
47 !d.
48 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) states, in part:
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court where the court knows
or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's
tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending
proceedings and of their right of intervention . . . . No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at
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tribe, and recognizes a tribal interest similar to the interests
reserved for family members in non-Indian custody proceedings. The tribe and the child's Indian caretaker may exercise
any of several options, including the right of intervention in the
proceeding. 49

2. The right of intervention
The right of intervention by the tribe or the child's Indian
custodian in any custody action for placement of an Indian
child appears to be unlimited and may be exercised at any
time. 50 Besides allowing broad intervention rights, the ICWA
grants tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings involving an Indian child. Tribes without tribal
courts, including most native Alaskan communities, protect
their interests solely through intervention in state proceedings.
The right to receive notice and to intervene is not subject
to discretion51 by state courts, and may be exercised against
the wishes of Indian parents. 52 Courts have held that tribes

least ten days after receipt of notice . . . . [The] parent or Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for such a proceeding.

I d.
49 "The Act . . . provides that Indian tribes are to play a central role in
custody proceedings involving Indian children . . . . If tribes are to protect the
values Congress recognized, they must be allowed to participate in hearings in
which those values are significantly implicated." In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d
154, 156 (Wash. 1986). An Indian custodian may intervene in any child custody action involving an Indian child. For a discussion of the relationship between an
Indian custodian and the tribe, see In re Charloe, 629 P.2d 1319 (Or. 1981). The
right of intervention is established by 25 U.S.C. § 191l(a) (1988).
50 25 U.S.C. § l91l(c) (1988).
51 In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1986).
52 A case from Montana graphically illustrates this problem from the parental viewpoint. In spite of vehement protests by a member of the White Mountain
Apache tribe, her parental rights were terminated by the tribe and her child declared a ward of the tribal court. Though concluding that the state court had no
choice but to transfer the case to tribal court, Justice Weber stated the following
in a dissenting opinion:
First, I am shocked at the Tribe's apparent disregard of the due process
rights of the parent . . . . Also shocking to me is the apparent ease with
which the Tribe now argues against the desires of the mother, one of its
own tribal members . . . . Who is left to represent the rights of the individual Indian mother when she is so abandoned by her tribe?

In re Parental Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Mont. 1989).
Referring to Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989),
Justice Weber continued:
This holding indicates the interests of the tribe now are superior to the in-
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have an "absolute" right of notice and intervention in a hearing
concerning the voluntary or involuntary surrender of parental
rights by the parent of an Indian child. 53 In another Alaska
case, Alaskan Supreme Court Justice Rabinowitz, in a strongly
worded dissenting opinion, discussed the interests of the parents and the tribe in the Indian child:
[The] tribe has a right to intervene at any point in any
State proceeding regardless of the parent's consent. This right
to intervene is absolute, as an instrumental part of the jurisdictional scheme "at the heart of the ICWA." Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians u. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). To
deny tribes this right in voluntary proceedings is to allow
parents to defeat the Congressional scheme by usurping the
tribe's equal interest in the Indian child. Id. at 1610, 4415.
("[T]he tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct
from but on a parity with the interest of the parents.") (citing
In re Adoption of Halloway, 48 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 732 P.2d
962, 969-70 (Utah 1986). 54

The notion of "parity" between tribal and parental interests
is startling to many non-Indian social workers and courts 55
and may lead to friction between the tribe and the state. 56 The
role the tribe plays in Indian life has no counterpart in contemporary non-Indian American society. Consequently, state welfare workers may be confused and even hostile when confronted with what appears to be unwarranted intrusion by a tribe
asserting the "equal interest" of parents and tribes in Indian
children. 57 The incidence of such confrontation is minimized
by the jurisdictional grant to tribal courts.

terests of the parents . . . . [I]t was questionable whether Congress intended to deprive Indian parents of their wishes in regard to the placement of
their children. Parental rights are among the most significant rights granted to any human being.

I d.
53 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); In re
Adoption of Halloway, n2 P.2d 963 (Utah 1986).
54 Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. Cook Inlet Tribal Council, 783 P.2d 1159,
1162 (Alaska 1989).
55 Id.; see also In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 96::! (Utah).
56 For a discussion of what constitutes parental abandonment, see In re
J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1990).
57 See, e.g., Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. Cook Inlet Tribal Council, 783 P.2d
1159 (Alaska 1989).
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Jurisdiction of tribal courts in child custody proceedings

Indian leaders, concerned over perceived insensitivity by
state courts and welfare agencies to the unique needs of Indian
children, supported a statutory grant of exclusive tribal court
jurisdiction in adoptions and foster care placements. 58 Unless
preempted by federal law, the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction in any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child domiciled on the reservation. If federal law preempts
tribal jurisdiction, the state has jurisdiction, but is still subject
to the notice and intervention requirements of the ICWA. 59
Proceedings involving Indian children not domiciled on a
reservation are always subject to the tribe's right to assert its
interest. Absent good cause to the contrary, 60 state courts
must, on petition of the child's parent, Indian custodian, or
tribe, 61 transfer to the tribal court any custody proceeding
involving an Indian child who is not residing on, or domiciled
on, the reservation, subject to two limitations: ( 1) the objection
of either parent to transferring the proceeding, and (2) the
right of the tribal court to decline the transfer. 62 The Act does
not define "good cause" in this context, however, and state
courts have some discretion in determining what constitutes
good cause for not transferring a proceeding. B:l
Also of concern to child welfare authorities and to adoptive
parents, is the provision that gives the tribal court jurisdiction
except "where such jurisdiction is vested in the State 64 by ex-

fi8 Lynn A. Kerbeshian, Domicile: FedPral Definition of Domicile Determines
Junsdiction Under Indian Child Welfarr' Act, 66 N.D. L. REV. fi5:3 (1990).
fi9 2fi U.S.C. §§ 191l(a), 191l(c), 1912(a) (1988).
60 In addition, published guidelines from the Bureau of Indian Affairs list
the following as "good cause" to prevent transfer of an action to a tribal court:
objection to transfer by a child over the age of 12 or parents of a child over the
age of five, or little contact of the child with his tribe. Guidelines for State Courts:
Indian Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67, 584, fi91 (1979).
61 See. e.f?., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 489 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. 1986).
62 25 U.S.C. § 191l(b) (1988).
6:1 SPP, e.g, In rP Appeal of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287,
828 P.2d 124fi (Ariz. 1991); Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797 (9th
Cir. 1990); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985);
Brown v. Rice, 760 F. Supp. 1459 (Kan. 1991).
64 State court jurisdiction exists in some cases through Public Law 280,
which granted civil jurisdiction to states over civil actions "between Indians to
which Indians arc parties" in certain specific geographic areas: all of Alaska, Nebraska, or California, and most of Minnesota. Oregon, and Wisconsin, with the
exception of certain named reservations. 28 U.S.C. § 1:160(a) (1988).
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isting Federallaw."65 Domicile plays an important role in such
determinations. The tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction for
children of parents domiciled on the reservation. For children
domiciled off the reservation, tribal court jurisdiction may be
concurrent with state court jurisdiction, creating complexities
not adequately addressed by the ICWA. The issue of domicile
may become a serious contention to the detriment of the child.
Its determination is always subject to a charge of error. 66

4. Placement preferences of the ICWA
The ICWA purports to accomplish its goals by imposing a
hierarchy of placement preferences upon the courts. These
preferred placements reflect Indian cultural values and the
important roles the tribe and extended family play in Indian
societies. In order of priority, adoptive placement preferences
under the ICWA are: (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the child's tribe; or (3) other Indian
families. 67
The statute applies only to state court proceedings. Tribal
courts are not subject to provisions of the ICWA, presumably
because they are expected to act in harmony with Indian priorities. As a result, tribes may substitute their own list of preferences for those imposed on state courts. 68 In protecting tribal
interests, tribal courts frequently disregard the explicit wishes
of parents and family members, and award custody to tribal
members and extended family even though parents have expressed preferences for off-reservation or non-Indian adoptive
placement. 69 State courts are expected to apply Indian cultural or community standards in the implementation of the preference directives. 70 The placement preferences of the Act may be
65 25 U.S.C. § 191l(a), 191l(c) (1988).
66 As Justice Steven's dissent in Holyfield points out, "any adoption of an
Indian child effected through a state court will be susceptible of challenge no matter how old the child and how long it has lived with its adoptive parents." Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. ao (1989); see also In re Adoption
of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
67 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
68 !d.
69 The tribe may establish a different order of preference, and may, "where
appropriate," consider the preferences of the Indian child or parent. 25 U.S.C. §
1915(c) (1988). See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30
(1989); In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986); In re Parental
Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d 1219 (Mont. 1990); In rP Adoption of Bahy Boy
1., 64;{ P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
70 "The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of
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set aside by state courts for "good cause" though the statute
fails to define this term. 71 Despite occasional jurisdictional
disputes between tribes, parents, and extended families, tribal
jurisdiction over child custody has proven to be a powerful tool
in the hands of Indian tribes, since state courts are required to
accord "full faith and credit" to tribal adoption and placement
orders.n
C.

Constitutional Concerns Raised by the ICWA

The passage of the ICWA in 1978, and its subsequent implementation in the various tribal and state courts have raised
several Constitutional questions. Not all of these questions
have been resolved to the satisfaction of parties directly involved in Indian affairs. Despite these difficulties, few detractors have been willing to speak against the stated purposes of
the Act since the general end the Act aims to achieve is widely
believed to be laudable. 7:J The means used to achieve that end,
however, have been criticized.
The ICWA may be seen as a jurisdictional encroachment
on the traditional right of states to regulate family law within
their borders. During the hearings prior to passage of the
ICWA, a statement from the Department of Justice placed this
issue in clear focus:
[W]e are not convinced that Congress' power to control the
incidents of such litigation involving nonreservation Indian
children and parents pursuant to the Indian commerce clause
is sufficient to override the significant State interest in regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising
State jurisdiction over what is traditionally a state matter. 74

The obvious and undeniable racial basis of the Act may

this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties." 25 U.S.C. §
19Hi(d) (1988).
71 ld.
72 ld.
7:-! Because of this reference to protecting Indian families, there has been
some discussion as to whether the ICWA was intended to apply only where there
was an intact Indian family. Such an interpretation would preclude application to
children of unwed or divorced parents. This does not appear to be the interpretation of most courts. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993). See supra
note ::l8 and accompanying text.
74 H.R. REP. No. 95-1::186, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1978).
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also violate the Fifth Amendment. It can be argued that the
ICWA is regulation and jurisdiction based on race alone. The
Department of Justice expressed concern about denying access
to state courts to Indians who have chosen not to participate in
tribal activities. It is questionable whether Congress intended
such a person to be forced, based only on his race, to submit to
tribal court rulings regarding such important matters as child
custody, when a similarly situated non-Indian would have
access to the full range of lower and appellate courts of his
state:
An eligible Indian who has chosen, for whatever reasons, not
to enroll in a tribe would be in a position to argue that depriving him of access to the state courts on matters related to
family life would be invidious. Such an Indian presumably
has, under the First Amendment, the same right of association as do all citizens, and indeed would appear to be in no
different situation from a non-Indian living on the reservation
who . . . would have access to State courts. The only difference between them, in fact, would be the racial characteristics
of the former. 75

While Congress did discuss and debate these issues prior
to passage of the ICWA, the conflicts were not resolved to
everyone's satisfaction. 76 Whether constitutional compromises
were made, and if so whether they were justified by the good
that was expected to be accomplished remains a question over
which reasonable people may disagree. These issues remain in
the background in most custody proceedings involving the
ICWA, though they never disappear. Indian and non-Indian
parents and guardians disagree about the racial impact of the
Act on individual rights, especially when the ICWA is used to
accomplish goals far removed from its stated purposes. The
ICWA has been invoked in custody proceedings involving an
Indian child, defined for the purposes of the Act, with as little
as 1/64th Indian ancestry, whose parents had no ties whatsoever to Indian culture. 77 The ICWA was merely used as a tool to
invalidate a state court action. In such a case, the Act cannot

75 H.R. REP. No. 9fi-UlH6, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. :l7 (1971\).
76 See, for example, In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D.
1980), where a South Dakota court dismssed state and federal constitutional concerns raised hy the ICWA and concluded that there was no substantial constitutional conflict.
77 In rP Adoption of T.N.F., 7Sl P.2d 97:1 (Alaska l9H9).
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fulfill its stated purpose-to protect Indian families. 78 In the
case of F.H., there was no intact Indian family to be protected.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE ICWA TO THE ADOPTION OF F.H.

A.

The Issue in the Lower Court

The Superior Court of Alaska was asked to decide whether
good cause existed to disregard the placement preferences of
the ICWA, and allow a non-Indian adoptive placement of F.H.,
an Indian child. It held that there was good cause to deviate
from the mandated placement preferences. The Village of
Noatak appealed, exercising its right of intervention under
Section 1911(c) ofthe ICWA.

B.

The Issue on Appeal

On appeal by the village, the issue as stated by the Supreme Court of Alaska, was "whether the superior court erred
in concluding that good cause existed to deviate from the adoptive placement preferences mandated under ICWA."79 The ruling of the lower court could be overturned only if there was
abuse of discretion, or if "controlling factual findings are clearly
erroneous."80 The adoptive parents had to show by a preponderance of evidence that good cause existed to permit a placement not in accord with the ICWA placement preferences. In
addition to the ICWA, state adoption regulations address the
issue of discretion. 81

C.

The Village of Noatak's Argument

For the village, opposition to the placement was based on
the principle that a non-Indian placement would deny the child
access to her native culture. ICWA guidelines gave first priority
preference to Mary Penn, who satisfies two criteria, as the
child's aunt, and a member of the native village.
Furthermore, the village maintained that all three ICWA
78 See also In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. 1993). An unmarried
teenage mother, one-eighth Cherokee, with no ties to Indian culture or tribal members, enrolled in the Cherokee tribe one week prior to the state custody hearing,
with no purpose other than to defeat state court jurisdiction and revoke her consent to adoption of her baby, who was 1/16th Cherokee.
79 Adoptwn of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363.
80 !d.
81 Alaska Adoption Rule 11(0 (1991) provides that "good cause" is a matter
of discretion for the state court. !d. at 1363.
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placement preferences 82 must be considered before an outside
placement could occur. This argument, which would require
exhaustion of all other possibilities in preference to a non-Indian placement, would virtually guarantee denial of the Hartley
adoption.
The village relied upon the decision in Holyfield, 83 arguing that parental preference was not controlling and could not
be used to determine an adoptive placement in opposition to
the interests of the child's tribe. The village also argued that
even if the court found that the preference of the biological
mother could be used to establish good cause, it should be disregarded in the instant case, contending that E.P.D.'s decision
to relinquish her parental rights was not reasonable or knowledgeable. 84
The village submitted affidavits stating that E.P.D. and
other family members would have access to F.H. in Noatak if
the Mary Penn placement was approved. 85 Absent was any
reference to the best interest of F.H. An unspoken assumption
seems to have been that the child's interests are subsumed in
the tribal interest. 86

D.

The State's Argument

The lower court placed considerable emphasis on maternal
preference and the fact that E.P.D. had signed away her parental rights at a hearing where the "terms and consequences" of
her decision were openly discussed. 87 The court specifically
followed the recommendation of Probate Master John E.
Duggan, acknowledging the "strong and consistent preference"
of the birth mother for the Hartley placement, and against

82 The order of preferences are: (1) a member of the child's immediate family, (2) a member of the child's tribe, and (3) any other Indian family. 2fi U.S.C. §
1915(a) (1988).
83 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
84 This conclusion is supported by the following:
E.P.D. had offered to relinquish F.H. to several people, including Mary
Penn. At least once, she adamantly opposed placement with the Hartleys.
She admitted that when she signed the relinquishment to the Hartleys
she was so mixed up she would have signed anything. Noatak argues
that E.P.D.'s decision was based in part on her belief that F.H. had serious health problems.
Adoption of F.H., 8fi1 P.2d at 1364.
85 ld. at 1368-65.
86 ld.
87 ld.
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placement of her daughter in the village of Noatak. 88
Additionally, the court looked to other factors, including
the bond between F.H. and Nancy Hartley, and the open adoption agreement that permitted visitation rights by E.P.D. and
informational access to all parties to the adoption. 89 The court
gave some weight to E.P.D.'s statement that she could more
easily visit F.H. in Kennewick than in Noatak. 90 There is no
reference to visitation by other family or tribal members, and
the court seems not to have considered this a priority. 91
The lower court found three factors determinative in this
case: ( 1) matemal preference, (2) the bond between the child
and the adoptive parents, and (3) the openness of this adoption.92 These factors, taken together, constituted good cause to
deviate from the preferred placement of the ICWA. 93 This reasoning indicates that the court gave considerable weight to the
individual preferences and needs of the biological mother and
child, rather than merely focusing on tribal interests. 94

E.

Holding of the Supreme Court of Alaska

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the trial court decision, finding a good cause exception to ICWA placement preferences.95 In so doing, the Court reasoned that the best interest
of the child was to continue her placement with the
Hartleys. 96 The court rejected arguments that the ICWA preferences must be exhausted before any other placement could be
considered. 97 This interpretation gives new breadth to the concept of "best interests" in the context of the ICWA. 98 Another
observer has noted the irony of weighing the welfare of chil88 [d.
89 I d.
90 I d.
91 I d.
92 ld. at 1363.
93 ld. at 1365.
94 See generally Dale, supra note 1; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah
1986).
95 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1365.
96 State welfare officials were unanimous in their recommendation that F.H.
remain with the Hartleys. F.H.'s case worker from the Alaska DFYS, who moni·
tored the family until the Hartleys moved to Washington in 1991, stated that she
helieved F.H. should have remained with the Hartleys. Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d
at 1364.
97 ld. at 1364 n.3.
98 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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dren like F.H. against the interests of their tribes:
It is somewhat paradoxical that the ICWA which was enacted
to further the best interests of Indian children forbids considering the best interest of the individual child. The ICWA
presumes that the child's best interest results from protecting
the relationship between the child and the tribe. A traditional
"best interest of the child" standard was rejected by Congress
because it was susceptible to bias by state agencies and
courts. However, the rejection of the best interest standard
may work to the disadvantage of the child because interest in
tribal integrity and self-government is given precedence over
the child's interests. 99

This decision by the Supreme Court of Alaska attempts to
address the controversy, balancing the needs and well-being of
F.H., a vulnerable three year old, against her native village's
interest in preserving its connection to its children. The open
nature of this adoption gives F.H. access to her extended family
and her native roots. The loving and supportive environment of
her adoptive family will provide the child with emotional support, medical care, and other needs. Perhaps just as important,
however, is the fact F.H. has been spared the tragedy of separation from the woman she loves as her mother, a bonding described by F.H.'s social worker, as "the best she will ever
have.'' 100 This court determined that the good cause provision
may allow an alternative placement preference which need not
be the option of last resort. 101 In this humane and reasoned
decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska weighed competing
interests to find that the child's best interests constituted good
cause to deviate from ICWA preferred placement guidelines.102

99 Kerbeshian, supra note 58, at 556.
100 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. These guidelines define "good
cause" to prevent transfer of an action to a tribal court, though not for deviation
from the placement preferences. How much discretion in placement is allowed state
courts is an issue before the court in the instant case. For a discussion of the best
interests of the child in relation to the best interest of the tribe, see In re Adoption of Doe, 555 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1976).
102 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The village had argued that
the court was required to exhaust all other options under the ICWA before it could
approve a non-preferred placement. This court rejected that argument.
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CONCLUSION

The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed to prevent the
destruction of Indian families. In implementing the statute,
however, state courts have been brought face-to-face with unavoidable conflicts between Indian family norms and those of
non-Indians. Non-Indian social welfare agencies have traditionally emphasized the welfare of the individual child and the
preference of the biological parents, a position that Indians
have considered far too narrow. The pervasive role of the tribe
in Indian life has no counterpart in other contemporary cultures in this country, and it has been difficult for tribes to
communicate their values to the predominantly non-Indian
judicial system. Tribes have equated their own interests with
the best interests of the child, a view difficult for state courts to
adopt wholeheartedly; nevertheless, states have been forced by
the ICWA to develop tolerance of tribal interests. In the end,
tribes will win only when each Indian child who goes into foster care or adoptive placement has the opportunity to grow in a
nurturing environment, enriched by access to his or her native
culture.
Ivy N. Voss

